Privacy-preserving data search with fine-grained dynamic search right management in fog-assisted Internet of Things by Zhou, R et al.
Privacy-Preserving Data Search with Fine-grained
Dynamic Search Right Management in Fog-assisted
Internet of Things
Rang Zhou, Xiaosong Zhang*, Xiaofen Wang
Center for Cyber Security and School of Computer Science and Engineering, University of
Electronic Science and Technology of China,
Chengdu, Sichuan, China
Guowu Yang
Big Data Research Center and School of Computer Science and Engineering, University of
Electronic Science and Technology of China,
Chengdu, Sichuan, China
Hao Wang
Information Technology and Electrical Engineering, Norwegian University of Science and
Technology,
Gjφvik, Norway
Yulei Wu*
Department of Computer Science, College of Engineering, Mathematics, and Physical
Sciences, University of Exeter,
Exeter, EX4 4QF, United Kingdom
Abstract
Fog computing, as an assisted method for cloud computing, collects Internet
of Things (IoT) data to multiple fog nodes on the edge of IoT and outsources
them to the cloud for data search, and it reduces the computation cost on IoT
nodes and provides fine-grained search right management. However, to provide
privacy-preserving IoT data search, the existing searchable encryptions are very
inefficient as the computation cost is too high for the resource-constrained IoT
ends. Moreover, to provide dynamic search right management, the users need
to be online all the time in the existing schemes, which is impractical. In this
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paper, we first present a new fog-assisted privacy-preserving IoT data search
framework, where the data from each IoT device is collected by a fog node,
stored in a determined document and outsourced to the cloud, the users search
the data through the fog nodes, and the fine-grained search right management is
maintained at document level. Under this framework, two searchable encryption
schemes are proposed, i.e. Credible Fog Nodes assisted Searchable Encryption
(CFN-SE) and Semi-trusted Fog Nodes assisted Searchable Encryption (STFN-
SE). In CFN-SE scheme, the indexes and trapdoors are generated by the fog
nodes, which greatly reduce the computation costs at the IoT devices and user
ends, and fog nodes are used to support offline users’ key update. In STFN-SE
scheme, the semi-trusted fog nodes are used to provide storage of encrypted
key update information to assist offline users’ search right update. In both
schemes, no re-encryption of the keywords is needed in search right updates.
The performance evaluations of our schemes demonstrate the feasibility and
high efficiency of our system.
Keywords: Searchable encryption, Internet of Thing, Fine-grained search
right management, Fog node.
1. Introduction
The Internet of Things (IoT) is a kind of network where massive physical
devices are connected with each other through wireless or wired links. In the
last few years, the industry has witnessed a rapid expansion of IoT devices. It
is estimated that there will be around 50 billion IoT devices by 2020 2.5
Due to massive physic devices in IoT network, a great amount of IoT data is
produced, and cloud is introduced to store these data [31]. However, the cloud
server is not full-trusted. Thus, the sensitive IoT data should be encrypted
before outsourced to the cloud server. If an authorized user wants to retrieve
2URL:https://spectrum.ieee.org/tech-talk/telecom/internet/popular-internet-of-things-
forecast-of-50-billion-devices-by-2020-is-outdated
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the specific data, a privacy-preserving data search service must be provided.10
Researchers have designed many searchable encryption schemes [1, 5, 9, 10, 12,
13, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 30, 34, 36] to meet this requirement.
In a practical IoT system, user members always are changed. For example,
in a company or organization, as some new workers are employed and pervious
workers may leave, data search rights are authorized to the new workers and15
reclaimed from the left workers. Thus, the users’ search rights are changed
dynamically, including search right authorization and revocation, which can be
achieved through key update or data index update in searchable encryption
schemes. In the previous studies [1, 9, 10, 30], the search right management is
user-oriented, where the users can be either authorized or totally revoked.20
However, in IoT data search system, more fine-grained search right manage-
ment is needed. For instance, when a user transfers between different projects
in the same company, his manager may reclaim the data search right of the
former project and authorize that of the new project. For example, in a factory
of industrial manufacturing, a worker changes his position from workshop A to25
B. At this time, the data search right for the IoT data in workshop A should
be reclaimed and the data search right for the IoT data in workshop B should
be authorized to the worker. Such search right management is not considered
in the previous schemes. Therefore, search right revocation at document level
should be introduced.30
Another problem in IoT data search system is that IoT devices are compu-
tation and storage limited. To handle this problem, fog computing, which is a
practical platform with strong computation power and expandable storage[32],
is introduced by [20, 33]. However, in [20, 33], the data owner generates access
tree and uploads all keyword indexs, which consumes large computation and35
communication overhead at the data owner end and leads to network conges-
tion.
Therefore, an efficient fog assisted privacy-preserving IoT data search system
with dynamic search right management at document level should be designed.
With this aim, as shown in Fig.1, we propose a fog assisted privacy-preserving40
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IoT data search framework, where the data from each IoT device is collected by
a fog node, stored in a determined document and outsourced to the cloud, the
users search the data through the fog node, and the fine-grained search right
management is maintained at document level.
Data Owner
Cloud 
Server
Internal network
Fog node
Users
Internal network
Fog node
IoT nodes 
Figure 1: The fog-assisted privacy-preserving IoT data search framework
1.1. Our Contribution45
In this paper, we aim to solve the problem of fine-grained search right update
in fog-assisted IoT data search system. The main contributions include:
• We present a new fog-assisted privacy-preserving IoT data search frame-
work, which meets the performance requirement for resource-constrained
IoT nodes.50
• We design a new keyword searchable encryption system with dynamic
search right management at document level for IoT data. Moreover, the
credible fog nodes are introduced to maintain the function of user key
update for offline users.
• A concrete construction of credible fog node assisted searchable encryp-55
tion, i.e. CFN-SE, is designed to achieve the dynamic search right update
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for IoT data. Comparing with previous schemes, re-encryption on key-
word indexes is not needed in our construction, which greatly reduces the
computation cost.
• We present a semi-trusted fog node assisted searchable encryption system60
with dynamic search right management at document level. A concrete
scheme, i.e. STFN-SE, is constructed, which provides further fine-grained
search right management, where different users have different authorized
keys for the same document subset.
• We evaluate the performance of our schemes. The results show that the65
proposed constructions are practical for IoT applications.
The paper is organized as follows: related work is described in Section 2.
In Section 3, the preliminaries are introduced. The system model of credible
fog-assisted IoT data search system are described in Section 4. In Section 5, our
CFN-SE scheme is proposed. Security and performance analysis are discussed70
in Section 6. Section 7 describes a refined system model of semi-trusted fog
assisted IoT data search system and the STFN-SE scheme. The conclusion is
drawn in Section 8.
2. Related Work
To resolve the problem of complex trapdoor construction in symmetric search-75
able encryption [27], the notion of public key encryption with keyword search
(PEKS) is firstly proposed and a valid construction is designed in [3]. In re-
cent studies, researchers concern on the constructions of multi-key searchable
encryption and searchable encryption with search right update in practical ap-
plications.80
Multi-key searchable encryption. The multi-key searchable encryption frame-
work is designed by Popa et al. [23], and the first web application is built on
Mylar [24], where only a single token is generated and sent to server for keyword
search of different documents encrypted with different keys. Moreover, to solve
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the security problems under multi-owner setting in this framework, Tang et al.85
[29] proposed a provable security scheme. Liu et al. [15] designed a searchable
encryption scheme with data sharing. However, the major problem in these
schemes[15, 23, 29] is low performance, as the trapdoor size is linear with the
number of documents. To achieve restricted provable security, a proxy is intro-
duced to make a valid construction [22]. Unfortunately, heavy computation and90
communication overhead at the proxy are inevitable.
Key aggregation method was introduced in [7], with which a key-aggregate
searchable encryption scheme [5] is proposed. In [5], for each user, authorized
search key is computed from keys of all authorized files, and only one trapdoor
is generated for each query. However, Kiayias et al. [18] mounted two key95
guessing attacks to the schemes [5]. Li et al. [13] and Liu et al. [16] proposed
their improved schemes to maintain data verification and multi-owner functions.
Unfortunately, in [13] and [16], similar drawbacks as in [5] can be found. To
overcome the vulnerabilities in [5], Kiayias et al. proposed an improved scheme
[18]. However, it leads to more communication and computation cost, as a fully100
trusted aid server is introduced in the scheme. To reduce the overhead, Zhou et
al. proposed an improved scheme [36]. However, in their scheme [36], dynamic
search right management in practical applications is not considered.
Dynamic searchable encryption. Recently, to maintain forward secrecy in
dynamic searchable encryption system, the researchers introduced random num-105
ber to generate different authorized search keys in different time periods. Based
on BLS short signature [4], the keyword indexes are generated in two phases [1].
In the first phase, an index is computed by a corresponding complementary key
stored on cloud server, and in the second phase, the other one is computed by
data sender. Proxy method was introduced in [9, 10], where a search key con-110
sists of a secret key at the user side and a proxy re-encryption key at the cloud
server. In the constructions [9, 10], re-encryption consumes large computation
cost. Wang et al. [30] proposed a new forward secrecy searchable encryption
and reduced the computation overhead of keyword index re-encryption by em-
ploying a proxy. However, it is only for peer-to-peer application. Moreover,115
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fine-grained user right management at document level is not implemented in
above schemes.
Further, the researchers introduced attribute-based keyword searchable en-
cryption to provide fine-grained search right management[25]. In a recent study
[14], the search token is computed in two steps, where one is done by a secret key120
holder and the other by fully trusted party. Unfortunately, the schemes [14, 25]
are not applicable in IoT network due to the heavy computation overhead at
the IoT devices.
Searchable encryption in IoT networks. The researchers introduced many
constructions of attribute-based keyword searchable encryptions [35, 36] for IoT125
data search. Yang et al. [35] proposed a lightweight sharable and traceable
secure mobile health system, where attribute matrix is stored at data collection
ends, which is not practical for many applications, where the data collection
ends, e.g. sensors, have very limited storage space. Zhou et al. [36] proposed a
new construction, where the sensors collect and encrypt data without attribute130
matrix computation. Unfortunately, their scheme [36] is not practical if the
cloud server is far from the users, and large amount of communication is needed
between the IoT devices and the cloud server, as it would lead to network
congestion and delay.
To solve this problem, fog-assisted Internet of Things is introduced [33]. To135
improve the efficiency of [33], Miao et al. [20] designed an efficient ciphertext
policy attribute-based keyword searchable encryption scheme in fog computing.
Their scheme supports attribute update to dynamically change user’s search
right. However, in [20], the data owner generates access trees and computes all
keyword indexes, which are of heavy computation cost.140
3. Preliminaries
3.1. Bilinear Pairing
Bilinear Map. Let two multiplicative cyclic groups G1 and G2 be of the same
prime order p, and g, h be the generators of G1. A bilinear pairing e is a map
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e : G1 ×G1 → G2 with the following properties:145
1.Bilinearity: e(gr1 , hr2) = e(g, h)r1r2 for all g, h ∈ G1 and r1, r2 ∈ Z∗p.
2.Non-degeneracy: e(g, g) 6= 1.
3.Computability: for any g, h ∈ G1, e(g, h) can be computed efficiently.
3.2. Complexity Assumptions
We present two Multi-Sequence of Exponents Diffie-Hellman (MSE-DH)150
problems, which are two special cases of the general Diffe-Hellman exponent
problems in [2]. The intractability of the two problems is similar to the analysis
in [8].
Definition 1. (2n,n,1)-MSE-DDH Problem.
Let n be an integer and (p,G1,G2, e) be a bilinear map group system. Let g be a155
generator of G and h1 = gγ1 , h2 = gγ2 , where γ1, γ2 ∈ Z∗p. α, β1, β2, H1, H2, db ∈
Z∗p. Let σ be a one-time random number, f be a random polynomial of order
deg(f) = 1 and co-prime with α, Z be an element in G1. Given the following
sequences of group elements,
g, gβ1 , gβ2 ,
gβ2dbα
1
, · · · , gβ2dbαn−∗ ,
gβ2dbα
n+2−∗
, · · · , gβ2dbαn ,
gγ1dbα
1
, · · · , gγ1dbαn ,
gγ2dbα
1
, · · · , gγ2dbα2n ,
gβ2(q(α)dbH1+σ), gγ1β1f ,
gβ2(q(α)dbH2+σ), gγ1β2f ,
gβ2((q(α)+α
∗)dbH1+σ), gβ1σ,
where q(α) =
∑
j,j∈Fat α
n+1−j for any subset Fat and Fat ⊂ U − F ∗, and ∗160
means a random number chosen from {1, · · · , n}, the problem is to distinguish
whether Z equals to g(β2H2+α
∗γ2)f or some random element in G1.
Intractability of (2n,n,1)-MSE-DDH Problem.
Comparing with [36], one more random number is introduced in our hard prob-
lem. Therefore, the intractability of (2n,n,1)-MSE-DDH Problem is similar to165
[36] and we omit its proof here.
8
Definition 2. (2n,n,2)-MSE-DDH Problem.
Let n be an integer and (p,G1,G2, e) be a bilinear map group system. Let g be a
generator of G and h1 = gγ1 , h2 = gγ2 , where γ1, γ2 ∈ Z∗p. α, β1, β2, H1, H2, db ∈
Z∗p. Let f be random co-prime with α, whose order is deg(f) = 1, Z ∈ G1. Given170
the following sequences of group elements,
g, gβ2 , gx
gβ2dbα
1
, · · · , gβ2dbαn−∗ ,
gβ2dbα
n+2−∗
, · · · , gβ2dbαn ,
gγ1dbα
1
, · · · , gγ1dbαn ,
gγ2dbα
1
, · · · , gγ2dbα2n ,
gγ1f , gγ1β2f ,
g(β2H2+γ2α
1)f , · · · , g(β2H2+γ2α∗−1)f ,
g(β2H2+γ2α
∗+1)f , · · · , g(β2H2+γ2αn)f ,
g(β2H1+γ2α
1)f , · · · , g(β2H1+γ2αn)f ,
where ∗ means a random number chosen from {1, · · · , n}, the problem is to
distinguish whether Z equals to gβ2(α
n+1−∗dbH2+x) or some random element in
G1.
Intractability of (2n,n,2)-MSE-DDH Problem.175
Comparing with [36], one more random number is introduced in our hard prob-
lem. Therefore, the intractability of (2n,n,2)-MSE-DDH Problem is similar to
[36] and we omit its proof here.
4. System Model
4.1. Credible Fog-assisted Data Search System180
Fig.2 shows the credible fog-assisted data search system, which consists of
data owner, cloud server, user, IoT nodes and credible fog nodes, which are
described as follows.
Data Owner. The data owner manages the search right of his IoT data in the
system. He computes the search keys for the authorized users and stores them185
on the fog node for users ends, and index generation key for IoT nodes and
stores them on the fog node for IoT nodes.
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Figure 2: Credible Fog-assisted Data Search System
IoT nodes. The IoT nodes collect data, encrypt the data and the data’s key-
word information with symmetric ciphers, and upload them to the fog nodes for
IoT nodes. In general, most of IoT nodes are resource-constrained devices.190
Fog nodes. Two kinds of credible fog nodes, in internal network, are introduced
to reduce the computation overhead at the IoT nodes and the user ends. The
fog node for IoT nodes obtains data and keywords information from IoT nodes,
computes the keywords’ indexes, and outsources them to the cloud server. The
fog node for user ends receives the new search keys from the data owner and195
stores them, and it obtains the encrypted keywords from the users to generate
the trapdoors for query. Then it uploads the query trapdoors to the cloud
server, and also returns the cloud server’s query results to corresponding users
honestly.
Cloud Server. The cloud server provides the IoT data storage and search ser-200
vice for the users. The cloud server is supposed to be honest but curious, who
completes search queries honestly and does not modify the stored information
maliciously, but it is curious about the privacy of users’ search. Moreover, it
does not collude with other parties to guess the keyword information from the
indexes and search queries.205
Users. The users obtain search right from the data owner. When they want
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to search data, they encrypt the keywords, send them to the fog node for user
ends, and they receive the retrieved data from the fog node.
4.2. System Definition
Definition 3. As shown in Fig.2, the keyword searchable encryption system210
with IoT data search right update consists of the following eight algorithms:
Param(ξ): The algorithm takes as input security parameter ξ, and generates
the global parameter GP .
KeyGenS(GP): The cloud server takes system parameter GP as input, and
outputs server’s public and secret key pair (pkQ, skQ).215
KeyGenDO(GP, τ): The data owner takes system parameter GP, time period
τb as input, and outputs his/her public and secret key pair (pk, sk) and index
generation key ek.
Authorize(GP, τ, sk, S): The data owner takes the system parameter GP, time
period τb, data owner’s private key sk and authorized document set S as in-220
put, and outputs authorized key kau. The data owner sends (kau, S) to each
corresponding fog node for user ends through a secure channel.
Index(GP, Fi, pkQ, ek, w): For a document Fi (i ∈ {1, · · · , n}), fog node for
IoT nodes takes system parameter GP, index generation key ek, server’s public
key pkQ, the document number Fi, keywords w as input, and generates the index225
Index.
Query(GP, τ, kau, pk, skQ, w): A fog node for user ends takes system parameter
GP, time period τ , authorization key kau, data owner’s public key pk, server’s
public key pkQ, a keyword w as input, and generates query trapdoor Trw.
Adjust(GP, τ, pk, S, Trw): The cloud server takes system parameter GP, data230
owner’s public key PK, authorized document set S, query trapdoor Trw as input,
and outputs an adjust trapdoor Tri for each Fi in S.
Match(GP, τ, pk, skQ, S, T ri, Index): A deterministic algorithm runs by the
cloud server, which takes system parameter GP, time period τ , data owner’s
public key pk, server’s private key skQ, authorized document set S, an adjust235
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trapdoor Tri, an index Index as input, and outputs a symbol “True” if Index
contains the keyword w; Otherwise, outputs “False”.
4.3. Security Requirement
In a keyword searchable encryption system, two security properties, i.e. key-
word confidentiality and trapdoor privacy, are defined, whose security model are240
similar as those in [36].
Definition 4. A keyword searchable encryption scheme maintains keyword con-
fidentiality, if no polynomial time adversary A, who does not keep search key
of the challenged document, has non-negligible advantage in winning the chosen
keyword attack game.245
Definition 5. A keyword searchable encryption scheme maintains trapdoor pri-
vacy, if no polynomial time adversary A, who does not keep search key of the
challenged document, has non-negligible advantage in winning keyword guessing
attack game.
Moreover, in the keyword searchable encryption system, user right update250
consists of search right granting and right revocation. When a user’s search
right over some specific documents are revoked, the cloud server will never
return these documents as the query results. Thus, the forward secrecy must
be maintained in our system.
Definition 6. Forward Secrecy. A keyword searchable encryption scheme main-255
tains forward secrecy, if no polynomial time adversary A, whose search key of
the challenged document is revoked, has non-negligible advantage in guessing the
information of his revoked documents.
5. The CFN-SE Scheme
Param(ξ). The algorithm takes the security parameter ξ as input and gen-260
erates the bilinear parameters (p,G1,G2, e). It sets the maximum number of
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documents as n and the keyword space as m. It chooses a generator g ∈ G1 and
a collision resistant hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗p. The system parameters are
published as {p,G1,G2, e, g, n,m,H}.
KeyGenS. The cloud server chooses a random secret key β1 ∈ Z∗p, computes265
u = gβ1 , and sets the server’s private key and public key as (skQ, pkQ) = (β1, u).
KeyGenDO(GP). At time period τb (b = 1, · · · , ρ), the algorithm randomly
chooses db ∈ Z∗p. For authorized users, the algorithm performs the following
steps:
1. Randomly choose an element α ∈ Z∗p and compute the secret keys gi =270
g(α)
i ∈ G1 for i = (1, 2, . . . , 2n).
2. Randomly choose β2, γ1, γ2 ∈ Z∗p and compute the public parameters v =
gβ2 ∈ G1, h1,i,b = gγ1·dbi ∈ G1 for i = (1, 2, . . . , n) and h2,i,b = gγ2·dbi ∈ G1
for i = (1, 2, . . . , n, n+ 1, . . . , 2n).
3. Compute the index generation key ek = (ek1, ek2) = (u
γ1 , vγ1).275
4. Destroy α.
The data owner’s private key and public key are set as sk = (β2, γ1, γ2, {gi}i=1,2,...,2n)
and pk = (v, {h1,i,b}i=1,2,...,n, {h2,i,b}i=1,2,...,n,n+1,...,2n), respectively. Moreover,
the data owner distributes the secret key ek to fog node for IoT nodes.
Authorize(sk, S). The algorithm takes as input the data owner’s private key280
sk and the document subset S ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, and computes the authorized key:
kau,b =
∏
j∈S g
β2·db
n+1−j . The data owner securely sends (kau,b, S) to the fog node
for user ends.
Index(pkQ, pk, ek, Fi, l). For the keyword wl (l ∈ {1, . . . ,m}) in document Fi
(i ∈ {1, . . . , n}), the fog node for IoT nodes randomly chooses ti,l ∈ Z∗p, and285
computes the indexes C = (c1,i,l, c2,i,l, c3,i,wl) as:
c1,i,l = ek
ti,l
1 = g
γ1β1ti,l , c2,i,l = ek
ti,l
2 = g
β2γ1ti,l ,
c3,i,wl = (v
H(wl)h2,i)
ti,l = (gβ2H(wl)gγ2i )
ti,l .
Then the fog node for IoT nodes sends (C,Fi) to the cloud server.
Query(kau,b, u, v, wl). The fog node for user ends chooses a random x ∈ Z∗p, gen-
erates the trapdoor Trb = (Tr1,b, T r2) = (kau,b
H(wl)vx, ux) and sends (Trb, S)
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to the cloud server for query.290
Adjust(pk, i, S, Tr). The cloud server carries out the adjust algorithm and
computes the discrete trapdoors Tr1,i for each document Fi as:
Tr1,i,b = Tr1,b ·
∏
j∈S,j 6=i h2,(n+1−j+i),b = Tr1,b ·
∏
j∈S,j 6=i g
γ2·db
n+1−j+i.
Match(Tr1,i,b, T r2, pk, skQ, Index). The cloud server does the keyword match
computation for each document. For the i-th document Fi, the cloud server
carries out the test as follows:295
1. Compute pubb =
∏
j∈S h1,(n+1−j),b =
∏
j∈S g
γ1·db
n+1−j based on the subset
S;
2. Verify the equation
e(pubb, c3,i,wl)
β1 · e(c2,i,l, T r2)
e(Tr1,i,b, c1,i,l)
?
= e(h2,n+1,b, c1,i,l). If
the equation holds, outputs “True”. Otherwise, “False”.
The correctness of the match algorithm in our construction is shown in300
equation (1).
e(pubb, c3,i,wl)
β1 · e(c2,i,l, T r2)
e(Tr1,i,b, c1,i,l)
=
e(
∏
j∈S g
γ1·db
n+1−j , (g
β2H(wl) · gγ2i )ti,l)β1 · e(gβ2γ1ti,l , gβ1x)
e(Tr1,b ·
∏
j∈S,j 6=i g
γ2·db
n+1−j+i, g
γ1β1ti,l)
=
e(
∏
j∈S g
γ1·db
n+1−j , g
β2H(wl)β1ti,l) · e(∏j∈S gγ1·dbn+1−j , gγ2β1ti,li ) · e(gβ2γ1ti,l , gβ1x)
e((
∏
j∈S g
β2·db
n+1−j)H(wl) · vx ·
∏
j∈S,j 6=i g
γ2·db
n+1−j+i, g
γ1β1ti,l)
=
e(
∏
j∈S g
γ1·db
n+1−j , g
β2H(wl)β1ti,l) · e(∏j∈S gγ1·dbn+1−j , gγ2β1ti,li ) · e(gβ2γ1ti,l , gβ1x)
e((
∏
j∈S g
β2·db
n+1−j)H(wl), g
γ1β1ti,l) · e(gβ2x, gγ1β1ti,l) · e(∏j∈S,j 6=i gγ2·dbn+1−j+i, gγ1β1ti,l)
=
e(
∏
j∈S gn+1−j+i, g)
γ1·dbγ2β1ti,l
e(
∏
j∈S,j 6=i gn+1−j+i, g)
γ2·dbγ1β1ti,l
= e(gn+1, g)
γ1γ2·dbβ1ti,l
= e(g
γ2·db
n+1 , g
γ1β1ti,l)
= e(h2,n+1,b, c1,i,l).
(1)
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6. Security and Performance Analysis
6.1. Security Analysis
Assuming that the public cloud server is “honest but curious” and does not
collude with the the revoked users. We analyze the security properties of our305
scheme including keyword confidentiality, trapdoor privacy and forward secrecy.
Theorem 1. Keyword Confidentiality. In CFN-SE scheme, if there exists a
polynomial time adversary A, who can win the chosen keyword attack game with
non-negligible probability, then we can construct an algorithm B which can use
A to solve the (2n,n,1)-MSE-DDH Problem. Therefore, keyword confidentiality310
is satisfied in CFN-SE scheme.
Proof 1. Suppose there exists a polynomial-time adversary A, who can win
the chosen keyword attack with advantage . We build an algorithm B, who
simulates the challenger and has advantage e2qf in solving (2n, n, 1)-MSE-DDH
Problem. B’s running time is approximately the same as A’s. The universal315
keyword space and the file set are assumed to be W of size m and U of size n,
respectively.
Init. A declares the challenge file F# with size 1.
Setup. B is given the global parameters (p,G1,G2, e(·, ·)) as input and the
instance of (2n, n, 1)-MSE-DDH. We also have q(α) =
∑
j,j∈Fat α
n+1−j for any320
subset Fat ⊂ U − F#. f is random polynomial co-prime with α, whose order
is deg(f) = 1, and H1 = H(wl)(wl 6= wθ) and H2 = H(wθ). σ denotes a one-
time random number which different in each query. Then, H1 and H2 can be
computed. B is further given Z ∈ G1, and uses A as a subroutine to distinguish
Z = g(β2H2+α
#γ2)f or a random element in G1. If Z = g(β2H2+α
#γ2)f , B outputs325
1; Otherwise, if Z is random, B outputs 0.
To generate the system parameters, the simulator B sets h1 = gγ1 , h2 = gγ2 ,
and we have
v = gβ2 , h1,1,b = g
γ1dbα
1
, · · · , h1,n = gγ1dbαn ,
u = gβ1 , h2,1,b = g
γ2dbα
1
, · · · , h2,n = gγ2dbα2n .
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B sends A the public key pk = {v, u, {h1,i}i=1,2,...,n, {h2,i}i=1,2,...,n,n+1,...,2n}.
Hash Query. B maintains a hash lists L(wl, yl) and the hash list is initially set
empty. wl is queried keyword and wθ(wθ ∈ {w0, w1}) is the challenged keyword.
al is the value of the hash query for corresponding queried keyword and aθ is the
hash query result of the challenged keyword. Upon receiving a hash query for
wl, if wl is in the list L, B returns the corresponding tuple yl to A. Otherwise,
B sets the hash values as
H(wl) = yl =
 aθ, if wl = wθ,al, otherwise.
Then B adds (wl, yl) to the list L and returns yl to A. It implicitly sets H1 =330
H(wl)(wl 6= wθ) and H2 = H(wθ).
Phase 1. The adversary asks for the private key query and trapdoor query as
follows:
Authorization Key Query. A asks for the authorization key query for Fat,
where Fat ⊆ U − F#. B responds A with the authorization key. The result of335
the authorization key query kau,bq can be combined from g
β2dbα
1
,· · · ,gβ2dbαn−# ,
gβ2dbα
n+2−#
,· · · ,gβ2dbαn in (2n, n, 1)-MSE-DDH instances.
Trapdoor Query. A asks for the trapdoor query for (wl, yl) in the supposed group
Ft(Ft ⊆ U). B runs the Trapdoor algorithm and responds as follows:
Let (wl, yl) be the corresponding tuple in L and H(wl) = H1. If F
# ⊆ Ft, B340
randomly chooses a one-time random number σ ∈ Z∗p and computes the trapdoor
Tr = (Tr1,wl , T r2,wl).
1). If F# ⊆ Ft,
Tr1,wl = kau,b
H(wl)vσ = gβ2db(q(α)+α
#)H(wl)+β2σ
= gβ2db(q(α)+α
#)H1+β2σ,
T r2,wl = g
β1σ.
2).If F# * Ft,
Tr1,wl = kau,b
H(wl)vσ = gβ2db(q(α))H(wl)+β2σ
= gβ2db(q(α))H1+β2σ,
T r2,wl = g
β1σ.
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Tr1,wl , T r2,wl can be computed from (2n, n, 1)-MSE-DDH instance.345
Challenge. The challenge file set is F#, and two same length challenge key-
words are w0 and w1 (wθ ∈ {w0, w1}). A did not previously ask for the private
key query for F#, and trapdoor query for (Ft, w0) or (Ft, w1), where F
# ⊆ Ft.
B randomly picks wθ from {w0, w1}. Let (wθ, yθ) be the corresponding tuple in
L. Then B randomly chooses s′ ∈ Z∗p and responds A with the challenge index350
Cθ = (c1,#,θ, c2,#,θ, c3,#,wθ ) as
c1,#,θ = g
γ1β1s
′
, c2,#,θ = g
β2γ1s
′
, c3,#,wθ = Z,
where H(wθ) = H2. c1,#,θ, c2,#,θ can be computed from the element g
γ1β1f , gβ2γ1f
in (2n, n, 1)-MSE-DDH instance.
If Z = g(β2H2+α
#γ2)f , one can verify it by implicitly setting s′ = fs′′ as
c1,#,θ = g
γ1β1s
′
= (gγ1β1f )s
′′
,
c2,#,θ = g
β2γ1s
′
= (gβ2γ1f )s
′′
,
c3,#,wθ = (g
β2H(wθ)+γ2α
#
)s
′
= (g(β2H2+γ2α
#)f )s
′′
.
If Z is a random element in G, the challenge index Cθ will be random from A’s355
view.
Phase 2. A continues to ask for the private key query for Fat as Phase 1. A
continues to ask for trapdoor query for (Ft, wl) /∈ {(Ft, w0), (Ft, w1)}, where
the queried file set Ft and F
# ⊆ Ft, or (Ft, wl), where F# * Ft. B randomly
chooses a one-time random number σ ∈ Z∗p and computes the trapdoor Tr =360
(Tr1,wl , T r2,wl).
1). If F# ⊆ Ft, and wl ∈ {w0, w1}, outputs failure and aborts the game.
2). If F# ⊆ Ft, and wl /∈ {w0, w1}, H(wl) = H1.
Tr1,wl = kau,b
H(wl)vσ = gβ2db(q(α)+α
#)H(wl)+β2σ
= gβ2db(q(α)+α
#)H1+β2σ,
T r2,wl = g
β1σ.
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3). If F# * Ft, and wl /∈ {w0, w1}, H(wl) = H1.
Tr1,wl = kau,b
H(wl)vσ = gβ2dbq(α)H(wl)+β2σ
= gβ2dbq(α)H1+β2σ,
T r2,wl = g
β1σ.
4). If F# * Ft, and wl ∈ {w0, w1}, H(wθ) = H2.365
Tr1,wθ = kau,b
H(wθ)vσ = gβ2dbq(α)H(wθ)+β2σ
= gβ2dbq(α)H2+β2σ,
T r2,wθ = g
β1σ,
T r1,wθ , T r2,wθcan be computed from (2n, n, 1)-MSE-DDH instance.
Guess. A outputs its guess θ′. B outputs 1 if θ′ = θ; otherwise, outputs 0.
We can describe the simulation as that if Z = g(β2H(wθ)+γ2α
#)f , the chal-
lenge index is a right index which can be checked.
It is indistinguishable between the simulation and the actual attack. There-370
fore, when Z = Z# = g(β2H(wθ)+γ2α
#)f , the probability that θ′ is a correc-
t guess of θ is Pr[θ′ = θ|Z = Z#] = . In phase 1 and phase 2, assume
that A asks for trapdoor queries and authorization key queries at most qf and
qa times, respectively. Therefore, the probability of the event that B does not
abort in the trapdoor queries is 1−
(
1
qf
)2((2n−1)−(2n−1−1))
> 1/e and the prob-375
ability of the event that B does not abort in the authorization key queries is
1 −
(
1
qa
)((2n−1)−(2n−1−1))
> 1/e. B will abort if A does not choose w0 or w1
in the challenge phase. Therefore, the probability of the event that B does not
abort in the challenge queries is at least 1/qf .
The adversary here is similar as that in [36]. Therefore, the probability of380
the adversary A to win the attack game is at least /e2qf when B does not
abort, where e is a constant size named natural logarithm in mathematics. The
running time on B is almost the same as that on A. In conclusion, the keyword
confidentiality is maintained in CFN-SE.
Theorem 2. Query Privacy. In CFN-SE scheme, if there exists a polynomial385
time adversary A, who can win the keyword guessing attack game with non-
negligible probability, then we can construct an algorithm B which can use A to
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solve the (2n,n,2)-MSE-DDH Problem. Therefore, the query privacy is satisfied
in CFN-SE scheme.
Proof 2. The query privacy in CFN-SE scheme can be proved similarly as that390
of Theorem 1. Therefore, we omit its proof.
Theorem 3. Forward Secrecy. The forward secrecy is maintained in our
CFN-SE scheme.
Proof 3. In the time period τb, the revoked users could not get the new short
time authorized key kau,b from the data owner and only has the old short time395
authorized kau,past in time period τpast. There are two methods for the malicious
users to guess infer the information of the revoked documents.
In the first case, the malicious user infers the keyword information of the
revoked document directly. This is similar as the chosen keyword attack in
Theorem 1, which has been proved. Thus, the malicious user can not obtain the400
keyword information of the revoked documents.
In the second case, the malicious user generates the trapdoor Trpast =
(Tr1,past, T r2) from the old key kau,past, and submits Trpast to search the re-
voked documents. Upon receiving Trpast, the server does the adjust and match
algorithms as follows:405
1. Compute Tr′1,i,b = Tr1,past·
∏
j∈S,j 6=i h2,(n+1−j+i),b = Tr1,past·
∏
j∈S,j 6=i g
γ2·db
n+1−j+i
2. Compute the pubb =
∏
j∈S h1,(n+1−j),b =
∏
j∈S g
γ1·db
n+1−j based on the subset
S.
3. Test the equation
e(pubb, c3,i,wl)
β1 · e(c2,i,l, T r2)
e(Tr′1,i,b, c1,i,l)
= e(h2,n+1,b, c1,i,l)
Due to the fact that Tr′1,i,b 6= Tr1,i,b, the test equation does not hold. Then410
the revoked documents will not be returned to the user.
In conclusion, the forward secrecy is achieved in CFN-SE scheme.
6.2. Performance Analysis
In our CFN-SE scheme, Param, KeyGenS, Adjust and Match are run
on the cloud server. KeyGenDO and Authorize are run at the data owner’s415
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end and Encrypt is run at the fog node for IoT nodes. Query is run at the
fog node for user ends. In general, the cloud server is a computer cluster, which
has rich computation power and can complete many computation operations
quickly. Thus, we only analyze the computation overheads at the data owner’s
end and the fog nodes.420
Two different experimental settings are used to implement our system. The
JPBC and PBC library3 are used to complete the experiments. The experiments
are carried out on both smart phone and computer. The smart phone has a 64-
bit 8 core CPU processor (4 core processor runs at 1.5 GHz and 4 core processors
runs at 1.2GHz), 3GB RAM, and Android 5.1.1 operation system is run in it.425
The computer has Intel Core i3-2120 CPU @3.30 GHz, 4.00GB RAM, and
windows 7 64-bits operation system is run in it.
In our implementations, the type A elliptic curve E : y2 = x3 + x of 160-bit
group order is used. To maintain the security, our experiment is conducted as
|Zp| = 160 bits, |G1| = 1024 bits and |G2| = 1024 bits.430
The experimental results are shown in Fig.3. The computation costs of
KeyGenDO and Authorize running at the data owner’s end are shown in
Fig.3 (a) and (b). The computation cost of Index running at the fog node for
IoT nodes is shown in Fig.3 (c), and the computation cost of Index running
at the fog node for user ends is shown in Fig.3 (d). The evaluation analysis is435
shown as follows:
Data owner: The algorithms KeyGenDO and Authorize are run at the da-
ta owner’s end. From the results shown in Fig.3 (a) and (b), the computations
costs of KeyGenDO and Authorzie are linear with the maximum number of
documents and authorized search documents for one user, respectively. Espe-440
cially, when n = 1000, it takes 28067 ms and 283620 ms to run KeyGenDO
at a computer and a smart phone, respectively. In fact, before each period of
search right update, the data owner can use system idle in the data owner’s
device to complete the operations in KeyGenDO. Thus, the computation costs
3URL:https://crypto.stanford.edu/pbc/
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(a) Time cost of KeyGenDO (b) Time cost of Authorize
(c) Time cost of Index (d) Time cost of Query
Figure 3: The execution of the CFN-SE system
are acceptable.445
Fog node for IoT nodes: The algorithm Index is run at the fog node for
IoT nodes. As shown in Fig.3 (c), the computation costs of Index is linear
with the number of keywords for each document. Furthermore, we find that the
computation cost for generating every keyword’s index is a constant. Thus, for
both smart phone and computer, the performance of Index is efficient enough450
for practical use.
Fog node for user ends: The algorithm Query is run at the fog node for
user ends. As shown in Fig.3 (d), the computation cost of Query is linear
with the number of keywords in each query. Furthermore,we find that the
computation cost for generating a trapdoor of each keyword is a constant. Thus,455
this performance is also practical for both smart phone and computer.
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7. Refined Scheme on semi-trusted fog nodes
7.1. Semi-Trusted Fog-assisted Data Search System
System Framework for Semi Trusted Fog assisted Data Search. In the
basic construction, the fog nodes are credible. However, in practical applica-460
tions, the fog nodes are usually semi-trusted rather than full-trusted. Therefore,
the fog nodes only provide computation and storage service, and complete the
operations honestly, but they maybe curious about private data. To maintain
data privacy protection, the IoT nodes should compute keyword indexes and the
authorized users should generate query trapdoors by themselves. In addition,465
to meet further fine-grained search right management, different from CFN-SE
scheme, the data owner should distribute different authorized secret key to each
user in the system.
The semi-trusted fog-assisted data search system is shown in Fig.4. First,
the semi-trusted fog nodes provide the storage and forwarding services for all470
ends. For instance, the semi-trusted fog nodes for IoT nodes aggregate and
forward the data and indexes, which are collected by IoT devices, to the cloud
server. The semi-trusted fog nodes for user ends store encrypted search keys
which are given by the data owner for all authorized users. When an authorized
user wants to launch a search query, it obtains the encrypted search key from475
the fog nodes and generates search queries by himself.
Security Requirement. The security requirements of the semi-trusted fog-
assisted data search system is similar to the credible fog-assisted data search
system described in Section 4, including keyword confidentiality, trapdoor pri-
vacy and forward secrecy.480
7.2. System Definition
Definition 7. The semi-trusted fog-assisted data search system consists of eight
algorithms which are similar as those in Section 4. The only differences are
Authorize and Query, which are shown as follows:
Authorize(GP, τ, sk, S): The data owner takes the system parameter GP, time485
period τb, data owner’s private key sk and authorized document set S as input,
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Figure 4: Semi-Trusted Fog-assisted Data Search System
and outputs the authorized secret key kau and sends kau to each corresponding
user through a secure channel. For document set S, the data owner computes
kuser and stores (kuser, S) on the fog nodes for user ends.
Query(GP, τ, kuser, kau, pk, pkQ, w): An authorized user takes the system pa-490
rameter GP, the time period τ , kuser, the data owner’s public key pk, the serv-
er’s public key pkQ, a keyword w, user secret key kau,as input, and generates a
query trapdoor Trw.
7.3. The STFN-SE scheme
Param(ξ). The algorithm takes as input the security parameter ξ and generates495
the bilinear parameters (p,G1,G2, e); It sets the maximum number of documents
as n for a data owner and the keyword space as m. It Chooses a generator
g ∈ G1 and three collision resistant hash functions H : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗p, H1 :
{0, 1}∗ → G1, H2 : {0, 1}∗ → G1. The system parameters are published as
{p,G1,G2, e, g, n,m,H,H1, H2}.500
KeyGenS. The cloud server chooses a random secret key β1 ∈ Z∗p, and com-
putes u = gβ1 , and sets the server’s private key and public key as (skQ, pkQ) =
(β1, u).
KeyGenDO(GP). At time period τb (b = 1, · · · , ρ), the algorithm randomly
chooses db ∈ Z∗p and performs the following steps:505
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1. Randomly choose an element α ∈ Z∗p and compute the secret keys gi =
g(α)
i ∈ G1 for i = (1, 2, . . . , 2n).
2. Randomly choose the secret keys β2, β3, γ1, γ2 ∈ Z∗p and compute the
public parameters v1 = g
β2 ∈ G1, v2 = gβ3 ∈ G1, h1,i,b = gγ1·dbi ∈ G1 for
i = (1, 2, . . . , n) and h2,i,b = g
γ2·db
i ∈ G1 for i = (1, 2, . . . , n, n+ 1, . . . , 2n).510
3. Compute the IoT node’s secret encryption key ek = (ek1, ek2) = (u
γ1 , v
γ1β
−1
3
1 ).
4. Destroy α.
The data owner’s private key and public key are set as sk = (β2, β3, γ1, γ2, {gi}i=1,2,...,2n)
and pk = (v1, v2, {h1,i,b}i=1,2,...,n, {h2,i,b}i=1,2,...,n,n+1,...,2n), respectively. More-
over, the data owner distributes the secret encryption key ek to each IoT node.515
Authorize(sk, S). For each user with an identity ID, the data owner computes
the secret key kau = H1(ID)
β3 and securely sends it to the corresponding user.
For the document subset S ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, the algorithm computes the search key
kau,b = H1(ID)
β2 ·∏j∈S gβ2·dbn+1−j and kuser = kau,b ·H2(H1(ID)β3 , h1,i,1). The
data owner sends (kuser, S) to the fog node for user ends.520
Index(pkQ, pk, ek, Fi, l). For a keyword wl (l ∈ {1, . . . ,m}) in a document Fi
(i ∈ {1, . . . , n}), the IoT node randomly chooses ti,l ∈ Z∗p and computes the
indexes C = (c1,i,l, c2,i,l, c3,i,wl):
c1,i,l = ek
ti,l
1 = g
γ1β1ti,l , c2,i,l = ek
ti,l
2 = g
β2β
−1
3 γ1ti,l ,
c3,i,wl = (v
H(wl)
1 h2,i)
ti,l = (gβ2H(wl)gγ2i )
ti,l .
Then the IoT nodes sends the index (c1,i,l, c2,i,l, c3,i,wl) to the fog node for
IoT nodes. The fog node for IoT nodes sends (C,Fi) to the cloud server.525
Query(kau,b, u, v, wl). A user computes the authorized key kau,b = kuser/H2(kau, h1,i,1).
The user chooses a random x ∈ Z∗p , computes the trapdoor Trb = (Tr1,b, T r2,b) =
(kau,b
H(wl)vx1 , k
H(wl)
au vx2 ), and sends Trb to the fog node for user ends. The fog
node for user ends sends (Trb, S) to the cloud server for keyword search.
Adjust(pk, i, S, Trb). The cloud server carries out the adjust algorithm and530
computes the discrete trapdoors Tr1,i for each document Fi as:
Tr1,i,b = Tr1,b ·
∏
j∈S,j 6=i h2,(n+1−j+i),b = Tr1,b ·
∏
j∈S,j 6=i g
γ2·db
n+1−j+i.
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Match(Tr1,i,b, T r2, pk, skQ, Index). For the i-th document, the cloud server
carries out the keyword match test as follows:
1. Compute pubb =
∏
j∈S h1,(n+1−j),b =
∏
j∈S g
γ1·db
n+1−j based on the subset
S;535
2. Verify the equation
(e(pubb, c3,i,wl) · e(c2,i,l, T r2,b))β1
e(Tr1,i,b, c1,i,l)
?
= e(h2,n+1,b, c1,i,l).
If the equation holds, outputs “True”. Otherwise, “False”.
The correctness of the match test in our construction of STFN-SE is shown
in equation (2).
(e(pubb, c3,i,wl) · e(c2,i,l, T r2,b))β1
e(Tr1,i,b, c1,i,l)
=
(e(
∏
j∈S g
γ1·db
n+1−j , (g
β2H(wl) · gγ2i )ti,l) · e(gβ2β
−1
3 γ1ti,l , k
H(wl)
au v
x
2 ))
β1
e(Tr1,b ·
∏
j∈S,j 6=i g
γ2·db
n+1−j+i, g
γ1β1ti,l)
=
e(
∏
j∈S g
γ1·db
n+1−j , (g
β2H(wl) · gγ2i )β1ti,l) · e(gβ2β
−1
3 γ1ti,l , H1(ID)
β3H(wl)gβ3x)β1
e(k
H(wl)
au,b · vx1 ·
∏
j∈S,j 6=i g
γ2·db
n+1−j+i, g
γ1β1ti,l)
=
e(
∏
j∈S g
γ1·db
n+1−j , g
β2H(wl)β1ti,l) · e(∏j∈S gγ1·dbn+1−j , gγ2β1ti,li ) · e(gβ2γ1ti,l , H1(ID)H(wl)gx)β1
e((H1(ID)β2
∏
j∈S g
β2·db
n+1−j)H(wl) · gβ2x ·
∏
j∈S,j 6=i g
γ2·db
n+1−j+i, g
γ1β1ti,l)
=
e(
∏
j∈S g
γ1·db
n+1−j , g
β2H(wl)β1ti,l) · e(∏j∈S gγ1·dbn+1−j , gγ2β1ti,li ) · e(gβ2γ1ti,l , H1(ID)H(wl)gx)β1
e(
∏
j∈S g
β2·dbH(wl)
n+1−j , g
γ1β1ti,l) · e(H1(ID)β2H(wl)gβ2x, gγ1β1ti,l) · e(∏j∈S,j 6=i gγ2·dbn+1−j+i, gγ1β1ti,l)
=
e(
∏
j∈S gn+1−j+i, g)
γ1·dbγ2β1ti,l
e(
∏
j∈S,j 6=i gn+1−j+i, g)
γ2·dbγ1β1ti,l
= e(gn+1, g)
γ1γ2·dbβ1ti,l
= e(g
γ2·db
n+1 , g
γ1β1ti,l)
= e(h2,n+1,b, c1,i,l).
(2)
7.4. Security and Performance Analysis540
7.4.1. Security analysis
In STFN-SE scheme, the security properties including keyword confiden-
tiality, trapdoor privacy and forward secrecy are similar as those of CFN-SE
scheme. We analyze the security properties as follows.
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Keyword Confidentiality and Query Privacy. In STFN-SE scheme, the545
semi-trusted fog nodes are one kind of unauthorized users and obtain the same
information as the other unauthorized users. The only differences from CFN-SE
scheme are the indexes c2,i,l in STFN-SE scheme are modified, and the public
key v2 and encrypted information kuser are added. From these information, the
unauthorized users cannot obtain valid information to infer the search key and550
keywords. Therefore, the keyword confidentiality and query privacy are still
maintained in STFN-SE.
Forward Secrecy. To maintain the fine-grained forward secrecy, the data own-
er manages the search right for each document. Every user can not retrieve his
revoked encrypted documents, which are deleted from his search list. The anal-555
ysis of forward secrecy is omitted, as it is similar as that for CFN-SE.
7.4.2. Performance Analysis
In STFN-SE scheme, Param, KeyGenS, Adjust, Match algorithms are
run at the cloud server, which has rich computation resource and large storage.
KeyGenDO and Authorize algorithms are run at the data owner’s end, and560
Query is run at the user ends, both of which also have rich computation re-
source. In STFN-SE scheme, Index is run at the IoT devices, which are of very
limited computation resource. Therefore, we only analyze the computation cost
of Index run at the IoT nodes.
In practical applications, the IoT devices collect data automatically, and the565
computers or smart phones at the user ends do the data query. The data col-
lection frequency at the IoT devices is much higher than that of the operations
at the user end. Thus, we only analyze the operations in computing Index,
and compare its computation and communication overhead in our scheme with
those in [6, 14, 28, 35], which support the similar fine-grained search right man-570
agement function. The notions P,M1,M2 denote pair computation, exponenti-
ations in G1, exponentiations in G2, respectively. The value of l is the size of
the authorized attribute set.
As shown in Table 1, only in our scheme, computation and communication
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Table 1: Comparison of computation cost, communication overhead
scheme computation cost communication cost
[6] (2l + 6)M1 +M2 + P |Z∗p|+ (2l + 2)|G1|
[14] (l + 2)M1 +M2 + P (l + 1)|G1|+ |G2|
[28] (2l + 2)M1 (l + 2)|G1|
[35] 2M1 + 3M2 2|G1|+2|G2|+2l|Z∗p|
Our 4M1 3|G1|
cost on IoT nodes are of constant size. Moreover, for index computation, each575
IoT device needs to do 4 exponentiations in G1 for each keyword. Therefore,
this computation cost is of constant size and can be completed on resource-
constrained devices.
Then, we analyze the performance on resource-constrained devices, e.g. sen-
sors. The experimental results in [26] are used in our analysis. In [26], based580
on MICA2, the simulation runs on an ATmega128 8-bit processor clocked at
7.3728 MHz, 4-KB RAM, and 128-KB ROM. To maintain the 80-bit security
level, we utilize the super singular curve y2 + y = x3 + x with an embedding
degree 4 and implementing ηT pairing: E(F2271) × E(F2271) → F24∗271 . From
[11], a scalar multiplication operation in G1 takes 0.81 s and a exponentiation585
operation in G2 takes 0.9 s.
From Table 1, the test results show that the computation cost for running
Index in STFN-SE scheme at IoT devices is about 4 ∗ 0.81 = 3.24 s in our
scheme, and it takes about 2 ∗ 0.81 + 3 ∗ 0.9 = 4.32 s to run Index in [35] at
the same IoT devices. Therefore, our scheme is more efficient and practical for590
IoT applications.
8. Conclusion
In this paper, we propose two fog-assisted keyword searchable encryption
systems on credible fog nodes and semi-trusted fog nodes, respectively. We
construct two concrete schemes, which support offline users key update and595
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fine-grained search right management at document level. The performance e-
valuations of our schemes demonstrate the feasibility and high efficiency of our
system.
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